Tag: India

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Issue 23

A New Law Aims to Open Government Data to the Public. Can We Trust It to Deliver?

However unnerving the feeling of being surveilled is, collecting information about our interactions with the government has the potential to be immensely fruitful for journalists, researchers and the public. Whenever we fill out a government form or get our vaccinations done through public hospitals, the records we leave with them can be harnessed by those looking at it to trace back that interaction. Not only does this ensure transparency and accountability, but it can also be used to deduce important information about our economic and social reality.

Public institutions like government hospitals or the Statistical Ministry collect a massive bank of data from everyday operations and research. A new law, the Draft India Data Accessibility and Use Policy revealed on February 21 this year, has proposed to open this data to the public and controversially, put it up for sale in the private sector. Under this proposal, all data collected by every government body will be open by default unless specified otherwise and some other ‘special’ datasets will be out on the market. 

This move is in line with the international Open Government Data (OGD) movement which aims to liberate non-personal data collected by public entities and use it to formulate effective policy. According to the Working Group on Open Government Data at the Open Knowledge Foundation, OGD is essential for modern, democratic societies since it ensures readability, shareability, and transparency of government activities–citizens and civil society have the ability to peruse the state’s working together. 

While this sounds utopian for evidence-based policy-making, the historical records of governments generating, storing and releasing data in India have been muddy and many researchers have low levels of trust in the process. This is best illustrated by the Central Government’s ongoing fight with the WHO about the estimated pandemic deaths in the country. The WHO has estimated about four million excess covid deaths, which is in line with other scientific reports and shows staggering disparity when pitched against government data. The Center has disputed the report’s methodology and has itself come under fire for not providing coherent objections.

The story of India’s public data problem runs beyond the pandemic though, which has rightfully occupied our imagination for two years now. There are real issues with the way we collect data on the ground and they are not limited to emergencies like Covid. Long term policy goals like eradicating rabies by 2030 are getting stalled by the disaggregation of bodies responsible for collecting the relevant data and a lack of standardization. If two essential datasets generated by separate government offices do not use the same language or format, making them talk to each other and gain real insights becomes harder. 

Moreover, instead of obfuscating data to fend off criticisms, the government also has the option to simply not conduct the required surveys. The Household Consumer Spending Survey is one such important data collection drive which we have not heard of since 2011, until it was finally resumed this year. The National Statistical Office (NSO) is supposed to conduct the survey every five years but in 2017, the last time it was due, the NSO spoke of “data quality” issues that had prevented them from going forward with it. Many believe, however, that the survey was withheld due to an expected decline in consumer spending which would have reflected badly on the incumbent Modi government.


The overarching goal of OGD is instrumental–it is not only that government data should be open, but it also has to be actually useful. These foundational issues in how officials deal with data can make OGD platforms seem performative at best. The UN’s E-Governance survey conducted in 2020 which measured how robust a nation’s digital governance framework is relative to others placed India at the 100th rank amongst 193 countries included in the report. Without pooling resources to centralise, organise and secure the system that will eventually generate and carry the data, OGD might prove to be fruitless.

Rutuparna Deshpande is a second-year student of Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Ashoka University.

Picture Credits: Unsplash

We publish all articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noderivatives license. This means any news organisation, blog, website, newspaper or newsletter can republish our pieces for free, provided they attribute the original source (OpenAxis).

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Issue 23

India’s Growth Prospects – Are They Really Deterred by Religious Majoritarianism and Polarisation?

In a recent statement, former Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan warned that an “anti-minority” image could harm India’s growth prospects due to reduced demand for Indian products in the global market. Rajan’s comment came a day after Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-controlled North Delhi Municipal Corporation abruptly demolished properties, most of them owned by Muslims, in Jahangirpuri on the pretext of illegal construction. It has, however, been widely perceived as ‘collective punishment’ against Muslims after communal clashes in the neighbourhood days ago. 

Over the past couple of years, several observers have noted increasing religious majoritarianism and polarisation in India, coinciding with the rise of the Hindu Nationalist BJP in 2014. In the last couple of weeks, the headlines have been occupied with the Hijab row and Halal row in Karnataka and communal violence across several states instigated by religious processions, bulldozing of properties owned by Muslims, and so on. It is well-documented that religious conflicts positively correlate with BJP’s electoral performance.

Several well-meaning people, like Dr Rajan, have argued that the rising religious majoritarianism will harm India’s growth prospects. There could be two kinds of motivations behind such reasoning. First, it could be the case that they firmly believe in the argument. Second, they are internally dubious about the intellectual robustness of their claim but see these arguments as doing their bit to mitigate the rising hatred. 

Assuming the case to be the former, there are no strong reasons to believe that there is any threat to overall economic growth. The current form of religious majoritarianism is insidious in that it is based on everyday humiliation and targeting of minorities, mainly Muslims, as opposed to widespread, large-scale violence. Hence, there is no significant risk for companies to operate from a safety and stability perspective as of yet. While some may engage in virtue signalling, they will continue to do business as long as it is profitable — irrespective of India’s “treatment of minorities” — just as they operate in countries like China and Saudi Arabia with the worst record on human rights. 

It was somewhat of a coincidence that the Modi government has proven incompetent in handling the economy, particularly during its first term. The consequentialist arguments about threats to growth failed to mobilise voters amid the worst economic decision-making, such as demonetisation and poorly executed Goods and Service Tax (GST). Such blunders are not necessarily a given. The government may be able to clean up its act on the economy and deliver reasonable growth; it seems to be on the right path. As economic growth picks up, these arguments become even weaker.

India recently signed a free trade deal with Australia and is eyeing one with Europe. The country almost doubled the number of unicorns in just ten months in 2021, from 37 to 71. The latest IMF projections also suggest a healthy growth of 8.2% for this fiscal year. In addition, the government has made bold progress on long-awaited issues such as the sale of Air India. Most importantly, it has not embarked on economically foolish misadventures like demonetisation.

India is also a key partner for the US to counter China. The cooperation between the two countries is set to continue becoming more robust, with positive economic prospects for India. This is also why comparisons with Western boycotts of Russian business are not reasonable. Besides, the Indian diaspora in the west — a large proportion of which are hardcore Modi supporters — will countervail such tendencies if it were to happen at all.

Is this the best India can do? Probably not. A cooperative and peaceful environment would most likely reap higher growth. That is, however, besides the point. Counterfactual thinking does not come to an average voter. So, as long as India can sustain some decent growth, voters are unlikely to make a connection between religious polarisation and lower-than-ideal economic performance. Instead, if anything, proper economic growth could further overshadow and mask the rising religious polarisation in the short-medium run.

This is precisely the flip side of the consequentialist arguments of religious tension being a threat to growth. What happens if and when the government can deliver decent economic growth? Does religious hatred become a non-issue then? 

There is no escaping the elephant in the room. The rising religious majoritarianism and polarisation need to be confronted. The opposition parties failed to mobilise voters under the government’s poor economic performance; it is unlikely they can touch on this challenging topic. Ultimately, these issues are better addressed locally through meaningful community and civil society bonds.

A group of Hindus and Muslims in Jahangirpuri took out a “tiranga yatra” to send a message of unity and peace following the violence. These are exactly the kinds of concrete bonds we need and provide a ray of hope amid grim developments. 

Fahad Hasin is an associate at IDinsight. He also writes on politics, policy and society. You can access his newsletter and writings in popular media here. 

Picture Credits: DW

We publish all articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives license. This means any news organisation, blog, website, newspaper or newsletter can republish our pieces for free, provided they attribute the original source (OpenAxis).

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Issue 23 Issue 7

Through the Looking Glass: Gender Lens and Education Policy

In September 2020, the Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights (DCPCR) and the Directorate of Education initiated a joint project called the Early Warning System that utilizes school attendance records to develop interventions to curb dropouts by identified at-risk children. 

Prolonged absenteeism can lead to failing the course, especially in rural areas where students lack the financial resources to learn externally. Studies have shown that students who regularly attend school tend to perform better than those who are always absent, as frequent practising of skills helps build one’s ability to perform better than infrequent learning. It is thus essential to note absences and their reasons to ensure a balanced and consistent education for all.

DCPCR developed the policy expecting that the Covid-19 pandemic would lead to a rise in school absenteeism. The pandemic delayed the policy’s roll-out, but a pilot was initiated in October 2021, and the Commission fully implemented the policy in April 2022. DCPCR chairman Anurag Kundu explained that reduced or prolonged attendance as a metric would help gauge whether a child was facing a crisis at home that is affecting their education. The primary causes for absenteeism detected in the pilot included sickness in the family, moving back to the village, lack of parental awareness, labour, early marriage, taking care of household chores, and death. 

The system will send an automated SMS to the parent/guardian of any student who has missed more than 66% of working days in a month or missed more than seven days in a row. If there is no response, it will send an Interactive Voice Response (IVRS) call to understand the reason for absenteeism and make a note in the system if anything is detected. If there is still no response, the teacher will call the parents up and enter the details in the system. If the parents are unreachable or the child is detected to be “high-risk”, home visits will be conducted and adequate steps are taken on a case by case basis. 

Given the policy’s recent implementation, there isn’t substantial data on the interventions made in girls’ cases compared to boys. While the policy remains ungendered mainly, it is crucial to consider the differing reasons for absenteeism amongst girls and boys. Among adolescent boys, the most significant cause of missing school has been child labour which has been hard to solve since counselling and encouraging them to go to school may help, but the families still need their income. Amongst girls, on the other hand, the most prominent causes include early marriage and menstruation. Kundu said that four of their successful interventions were in cases where parents wanted to get their daughters, ages 15-17, married. The parents were counselled to push this decision until after they completed school. 

The policy could become fully functional only in April since its implementation depended on students physically attending school, which was optional until now due to the pandemic. The policy also made no arrangements for online schools or helping those facing difficulty accessing education while they were at home. In 2021, a Delhi-based NGO conducted a survey and found that 56.1% of girls had an increased responsibility to complete domestic chores during the pandemic with less time to focus on their education. Studies show a gender-based digital device, with 33.6% of girls not having access to digital devices and 64% saying that boys had more access to devices and the internet in their communities. Many girls studying before the pandemic couldn’t return to classes as their families didn’t want to spend their savings on their daughters’ education.

Unicef released an alarming report predicting that 10 million more girls would be at risk of child marriage by the end of the decade due to the pandemic. Education is a protective factor against child marriage. Still, with school closure and increased economic strain, girls are pushed into marriage as a last resort to help ease the family’s financial burden. Strict policies, ensuring access to health services and providing social support to families are vital to ensure girls stay in school. Similarly, another significant problem faced by girls attending school is menstruation. 

A 2018 Delhi based study found that 40% of girls didn’t go to school while menstruating. The fear and embarrassment that breeds from the social stigmas around menstruation and the lack of proper sanitary materials, no privacy at school, restrictions imposed on girls, and their mother’s education lead to a drop in attendance which hampers education. Not addressing these things in policy means that little will be able to be done when the issues arise. Interventions to reduce social taboos, increase awareness, provide healthcare and expand the curriculum to provide sound information are essential to combat this problem. The Early Warning System, like other policies, should find ways to implement interventions that account for these factors and include clauses that aim to address these gender-specific issues. 

The National Education Policy of 2020 faced a similar backlash. Specific provisions might promote girls’ education, such as the provision of a Gender Inclusion Fund which would be utilized towards an equitable education for girls and transgender students and an increase in public investment to bring down education spending. This policy, however, encouraged public-private partnership in education which might lead to more schools turning private and becoming inaccessible and unaffordable. Increased tuition would make it harder to convince families to spend on girls’ education and lead to them dropping out. 

While the EWS didn’t mention digital education, the NEP pressed on it without making any provisions for the infrastructure required. The policy’s consolidation of school complexes provision would increase dependence on Open School, the national distance learning program. Any emphasis on this for girls would lead to increased domesticity and curbs on their freedom where they would have a degree but not be able to do much with it. Here, not including girls’ education and other marginalized communities in the policy leads to exclusion. It is crucial to look at policy-making from a gender lens and make gender-specific policies to ensure genuinely equitable education for girls. 

The system will send an automated SMS to the parent/guardian any student who has missed more than 66% of working days in a month or missed more than 7 days in a row. If there is no response, it will send an Interactive Voice Response (IVRS) call to understand the reason for absenteeism and make a note in the system if anything is detected. If there is still no response, the teacher will call the parents up and will enter the details in the system. Home visits are conducted if the parents are unreachable or the child is detected to be “high-risk” and adequate steps are taken on a case by case basis. 

Given the policy’s recent implementation, there isn’t substantial data on the interventions made in the cases of girls as compared to boys. While the policy remains largely ungendered, it is important to consider the differing reasons for absenteeism amongst girls and boys. Among adolescent boys, the biggest cause for missing school has been child labour which has been hard to solve since councelling and encouraging them to go to school may help but the families still need their income. Amongst girls on the other hand, the biggest causes include early marriage and menstruation. Kundu said that four of their successful interventions were in cases where parents wanted to get their daughters ages between 15 and 17 married. The parents were counseled to push this decision until after they completed school. 

The policy was able to become fully functional only in April given that it can only be implemented when students are physically attending school which was optional until now due to the pandemic. The policy also made no arrangements for online school and helping those who were having a hard time accessing education while they were at home. In 2021, a Delhi-based NGO conducted a survey and found that 56.1% of girls had an increased responsibility to complete domestic chores during the pandemic with less time to focus on their education. Studies show a gender-based digital device with 33.6% of girls not having access to digital devices and 64% saying that boys had more access to devices and the internet in their communities. Many girls studying before the pandemic couldn’t return to classes as their families didn’t want to spend their savings on their daughters’ education.

The National Education Policy of 2020 faced similar backlash suggesting that while there were certain provisions that might promote girls’ education such as the provision of a Gender Inclusion Fund which would be utilized towards an equitable education for girls and transgender students and an increase in public investment to bring down education spending. This policy however might lead to schools becoming inaccessible and unaffordable and girls dropping out. It is crucial to look at policy making from a gender lens as well as make gender-specific policies to ensure truly equitable education for girls. 

Reya Daya is a third-year student studying psychology and media studies at Ashoka University. Her other interests include writing, photography and music.

Picture credits: Unicef

We publish all articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives license. This means any news organisation, blog, website, newspaper or newsletter can republish our pieces for free, provided they attribute the original source (OpenAxis).

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Issue 22

Sri Lanka’s State and Economy Are Crumbling. Could This Be the Watershed Moment for State Reform?

Despite being South Asia’s oldest democracy, having constituted a universal franchise as early as 1931, the island nation of Sri Lanka is far from donning the hat of a stable one and the path toward democratic prosperity remains murky.

The country has seen a bloody civil war between the minority separatist Tamil Hindu community and the ruling Sinhala Buddhist majority from 1983 to 2009. Post-war, its polity has been turning the page for the worse toward an authoritarian and hyper-militarized state under the stewardship of the Rajapaksa family, which has sowed its members in multiple important government positions.

The frontrunner of the family and Sri Lanka’s current President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, has today found himself at the centre of boiling anger on the streets over his mismanagement of the economy, leading to the biggest economic crisis since the country’s independence in 1945. 

Ailing with a host of structural issues within the state machinery of Sri Lanka, ordinary citizens who had put their faith in the Rajapaksa government’s Sinhalese nationalist project are starting to turn against the dynasty rule. Change in this nation seems eminent, but what does change look like? To answer this question, we can begin by understanding how the post civil-war state was set up to create conditions for a failing state and the on-ground situation during the current economic crisis.

The Governance Crisis

While most media outlets have been focusing on the economic aspects of this crisis, Sri Lanka had been going through a much more deep-rooted crisis of governance that has set up the stage for its near collapse. Since 2009, when the ruling Sinhalese nationalist government decisively and unexpectedly defeated the separatist group Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Rajpaksas have been in power for most of the period. The current president’s older brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa was the president from 2005 to 2015 and is now the prime minister. In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidency with 52% of the vote share and his party, the Sri Lanka People’s Front or SLPP enjoyed a supermajority in the parliament. 

This grip that the Rajapaksa family have had over the Sri Lankan state has resulted in policies that mainly benefit the ruling family and the Sinhalese majority. Violence against the Hindu Tamil minority and the even smaller Muslim and Catholic minority groups has been well documented. Since a major source of employment for the Sinhalese community is in the military, there has been widespread acceptance of increased military presence on the streets and further colonisation of the country’s Northern and Eastern provinces, where the minority population is concentrated. 

Infrastructure and other investments taken under this government have resulted in numerous dead or sinking assets for the state. Not only is this affair costly for the public, who pay for the Rajapaksa’s self-aggrandization (for example, the Mahinda Rajapaksa Cricket Stadium), it distracts from actual governance projects which have been given petty attention. Even civil society organizations have been silenced, journalists have ‘disappeared’ and political opponents have been humiliated. 

Civilians, even those who have previously supported the government’s agenda, have now come out to protest against Gotabaya. The slogan most prominent during protests is “Go Home Gota” after every other member than the president and his brother had resigned from the cabinet, including the finance minister who was sworn in just a day before. The public sentiment right now seems to be to oust the Rajapska family and move on. 

The Economic Crisis

The most jarring tell of the true severity of this crisis can be seen on the streets in the country’s capital Columbo. The city has been plunged into darkness with electricity cuts lasting for more than ten hours at a time. Essential supplies are sparse to find, including food and medicine – this has caused massive queues at shops and many hospitals have had to cancel routine services. 

For Sri Lanka’s poorest, the situation is unforgiving — most people have to make the choice between standing in long lines or going to work. Transport is also in peril because of fuel insufficiency, there simply is not enough energy to power public transport or for taxis and rickshaws to make even a marginal earning. Prices for every good on the market have soared due to inflation. The middle class, despite having its safety net of household savings, has not been spared from this wide-reaching conflict.

On the macroeconomic level, the country’s foreign reserves of the US Dollar have been depleted to three times its sovereign debt due to the tourism sector–the major source of dollar earnings for the nation — being hit hard during the pandemic. This has led to banks being unable to finance the import of the essential items that have disappeared from the market shelves. 

A shortage of the dollar also means that Sri Lanka will be unable to pay back the $51 billion debt it has taken from other countries and thus has led international agencies to downgrade the country’s credit rating. This has added to its woes by effectively cutting it off from international credit markets. 

What’s next?

Looking at this monumental crisis from a comprehensive state, society and economy angle we can deduce that this really does appear to be a tipping point for Sri Lanka. Though, if we have learnt any lessons from the Arab Spring, we know that authoritarian leaders who have embedded their power deep into the structure of the state can quash widespread protests. It is now up to Sri Lankans to consolidate their anger across ethnic and religious lines to have a successful watershed moment.

Rutuparna Deshpande is a second-year student of Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Ashoka University.

Picture Credits: Balkan Times

We publish all articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noderivatives license. This means any news organisation, blog, website, newspaper or newsletter can republish our pieces for free, provided they attribute the original source (OpenAxis).

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Issue 22

Super Sixer: Analysing the Success of Sports Cinema in India

In the closing minutes of Shah Rukh Khan’s 2007 blockbuster, Chak De India, the national women’s hockey team makes a triumphant return to India post bagging the coveted title at the world championship. As the team returns to India with gold medals hanging around their necks, one cannot help but feel a powerful sense of pride in being an Indian. Be it Lagaan’s (2001) underdog cricket team from rural India, or a female boxer from the farm regions of Manipur as played by Priyanka Chopra in Mary Kom (2014), sports films invoke a sense of national pride in audiences that is unmatched. 

With a welcome reception of the early ’80s and 90’s sports films such as Hip Hip Hurray (1984), Boxer (1984), and Jo Jeeta Wohi Sikander (1992), the trajectory of the portrayal of sports in Indian cinema adopted an upward trend, with actors and actresses increasingly starring in biopics portraying inspiring sportspeople on-screen and winning the hearts of India’s sports-worshipping audience. While such sports cinema covered a wide range of sports in the Indian context, ranging from cricket to hockey to wrestling, a similar diversity was absent in terms of plot imagination. A large portion of such sports films illustrates utopian narratives, an idea of the world as an idealistic paradise where hard work, fair play, and perseverance are the sole ingredients behind success in sports. 

Interestingly, these very banal ingredients are the strands that contribute to the popularity of such sports films. Uncomplicated storytelling that reinforces our belief in the world as an easy place where hard work is the key to success, contributes to the triumph of sports films in India. Despite being largely inspired by real-life sports players, the dramatisation of their lives, the intense rivalry between competing nations and players, and depictions of a separated lover who tends to players’ wounds between training sessions are components that enhance the relatability and our love for these films. Everyone loves watching a wholesome success story, and sports films always deliver just that. 

An important question that then must be addressed, is whether such straightforward narratives lacking complex socio-cultural or political layers can still be portrayed in the same way at a time when cinema emerges as a popular tool to express various social issues. Historically, while sports films have often adopted some complex additions to their plotlines, be it a Muslim hockey player with an anti-nationalist agenda or a female wrestler competing against prevailing social stigmas, their portrayal has been sidelined and almost simplified as a backstory. While this may be another tactic employed by the government to use cinema as a way to advance a soft image of India, it keeps intact the feel-good characteristic of sports films and ensures their commercial success. 

Even while talking about the mass appeal of sports films, what unites audiences and the on-screen players is emotion. A shared bond strengthened by love for the country, a familiar struggle to reach the top, and hero-worship of Bollywood actors. This sense of hero-worship is amplified when a popular actor takes on the role of a popular player, as was the case in 2016’s M.S Dhoni: The Untold Story. Interestingly, one may even observe a blurring of lines between a film’s emotional quotient, and the accurate portrayal of actual sports playing. Films like the worldwide phenomenon Lagaan, are very little about the art of playing a refined sport like cricket as compared to the sentimental value of playing against a colonial regime, patriotism, and national unity. Whether the film traces the history of cricket in rural India, or any other factor related to cricket is irrelevant. What ensured the victory of the film, was the emotions it made the audience feel. This however leads one to contemplate whether films in this category can even be classified as sports films or just heart-rendering movies about sports figures. 

While sports films highlight a sporting infrastructure easily available to the masses in every corner of the country, the reality on the ground might be a little different. For instance, while the government recently announced its plan to upgrade sports facilities in eight cities including Mizoram, Karnataka, and Kerala, a recent impact evaluation found that government sports facilities in Karnataka lack gender parity, with no separate hostels for men and women, lack of representation from minority communities, and lack of proper equipment. Thus, while some sports films highlight such structural issues, the overpowering emotion in these films may be glorifying sports in India and preventing stakeholders from evaluating the actual condition on the ground. 

Therefore, balancing realism, while maintaining the feel-good aspirational significance of sports films seems to be the next step for directors and movie stars. It will be interesting to see how audiences relate to such balanced films, and whether sports movies will continue to simply be our dose of ambition, or a conversation starter about the condition of sports in India. 

Jaidev Pant is a student of Psychology and Media Studies at Ashoka University. He is interested in popular culture and its intersections with politics, gender, and behavior. 

Picture Credits: Mirchi Play

We publish all articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives license. This means any news organisation, blog, website, newspaper or newsletter can republish our pieces for free, provided they attribute the original source (OpenAxis).

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Issue 21

On Russia-Ukraine, India is Boxed in by History and Geopolitics

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February – the first military attack on any European country since the Second World War – might have sharpened the growing rift between Moscow and the West. But, for India, it has thrown up a delicate diplomatic moment. New Delhi today finds itself awkwardly lodged between two major camps, both of which are crucial for its evolving geopolitical, regional and national interests. The net outcome has been India taking a firmly neutral stance on the invasion – neither supporting nor condemning it.

At the same time, the civil society and intelligentsia in India remains fractured on how to interpret the crisis. Factions supporting and condemning Moscow’s actions have emerged across the political spectrum, even creating some unlikely congruences between camps that are otherwise sworn ideological foes. This divide shows the complexity of the current situation and how Russian actions will continue to be seen differently by different groups of people around the world.

Even before the invasion, India offered a middle-point view at the UN Security Council in its meetings on 31 January, 17 February and 21 February (following Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s blustering pre-invasion speech). It called for de-escalation through diplomatic dialogue, respect for the UN Charter, the safety of Indian students in Ukraine, and “legitimate security interests of all parties”. The last point, particularly, has been interpreted by many, especially Western commentators, as India taking Russia’s side in the conflict. The reality, however, is more complex.

India’s arguably ‘neutral’ stance hasn’t dropped from the sky. It flows from a fairly long foreign policy tradition going back to the Cold War period, which has actively professed the idea of not siding with any major power bloc. Yet, as history shows, this nonalignment tradition has, in reality, encouraged a tilt towards the Soviet (and later Russian) bloc. We see the vestiges of that peculiar legacy playing out once again today.

Historical path dependency

India and the then Soviet Union developed a uniquely intimate relationship right from the first half of the Cold War. Despite his avowedly nonaligned foreign policy, it was clear from the beginning that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru preferred the Soviet bloc over the US-led Western bloc. Moscow’s generous financial aid to India was pivotal to his government’s industrialisation and institution-building plans. Notably, Moscow also used its sway over the Communist Party of India to help tame the anti-government insurgency that had become a headache for Nehru.

New Delhi’s tilt towards the USSR was further aided by the strong socialist thinking in influential sections of the Nehru government, including the Prime Minister himself and his Defence Minister, Krishna Menon. The fact that the US had begun to move closer to Pakistan further pushed India towards the Kremlin. These factors played a decisive role in setting the foundations for an enduring India-Soviet (later Russia) relationship.

Then in the early 1960s, India started buying the optimally-priced MiG-21 fighter jets from the Soviets, thus upgrading its air combat fleet by multiple factors. That heralded what was to become an era-defining defence and technical partnership covering both conventional military and nuclear technology transfers.

Over the next few decades, India and the USSR continued to back each other diplomatically at the international stage with great consistency – either actively supporting each other’s actions or staying silent. From refusing to condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to staying neutral on its invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, New Delhi took great care to keep Moscow in its good books. The USSR returned the favour by backing New Delhi on a range of sticky issues – from the first nuclear tests in 1974 to the annexation of Sikkim next year.

Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, New Delhi and Moscow inked the landmark ‘India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ in 1971. The pact, designed to counter the growing partnership between the US, Pakistan and China, played a key role in moulding the geopolitics around the Bangladesh Liberation War. As some scholars argue, it gave Prime Minister Gandhi the conviction to intervene with military force in East Pakistan without the fear of an adverse response by the US-China-West Pakistan axis.

This “reciprocity of silence” – as Professor Ramesh Thakur, who currently teaches at the Australian National University, once described the relationship – didn’t change after the fall of the USSR. The Kremlin refused to condemn India’s second nuclear tests in 1998 (Pokhran-II) and also stayed neutral on the Kargil conflict next year.

More recently, India took a neutral position on Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, emphasising on “legitimate Russian and other interests” – which, interestingly, is similar to India’s insistence on “legitimate security interests of all parties” in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis. India also backed Russian military involvement in Syria through the last decade. This was followed by a raft of Russian support or neutrality on India – such as Moscow refusing to back Beijing on the 2017 Doklam standoff, backing India’s abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, and taking on a mediatory role in the 2020 Galwan clashes.

This closely woven bilateral history and the mutual path dependency that it spawned make it nearly impossible for either party to jettison the relationship over a single crisis.

 Strategic compulsions and geopolitical dilemmas

A critical part of the mutual path dependency is India’s reliance on Russia for military hardware. A significant chunk of India’s core military platforms across all the three services – from fighter jets and main battle tanks to submarines and frigates – are built on Soviet- and Russian-developed technology. In 2010, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a “special and privileged strategic partnership” and since then, according to SIPRI data, nearly 62% of India’s arms imports have been Russian. In the same period, India has emerged as the biggest customer for Russian arms in the world, accounting for nearly 32% of all of Moscow’s exports.

If India wants to maintain its current offensive, defensive, deterrence and power projection capabilities, it cannot junk this key defence partnership. Just four years back, India bought five S-400 air defence systems from Russia, which will upgrade its deterrence capability against a rapidly modernising Chinese army next door. Last December, during Putin’s visit to New Delhi, both countries signed a ten-year defence cooperation pact, as part of which India will indigenously manufacture more than 500,000 AK-203 assault rifles.

Russian military technology is also crucial for India’s own arms export plans, which it wants to double down on over the next few years. The recent US$375 million deal for the sale of three batteries of the BrahMos missile, which is manufactured under an Indo-Russian joint venture, to the Philippines and the “gifting” of a Soviet-made Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar in 2020 are only two recent examples. Other countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have also expressed interest in buying the BrahMos to boost their strategic deterrence capabilities.

While the import of Russian arms might have dipped over the last decade, that doesn’t mean India can suddenly cut itself loose from Russia and switch to other buyers. Yes, it certainly needs to find other sellers in the long term so as to decrease its overreliance on Russian hardware, but it simply doesn’t have the capability to undertake a system-wide shift in the short term. Further, Indian arms imports have generally fallen between 2011-15 and 2016-20; so, the fall in Russian imports doesn’t suggest any long-term trend yet.

However, India needs to be cognisant of the adverse impact of Western sanctions on Russian defence exports. Although Moscow has assured India that its supplies will continue, there is little doubt that the sanctions will hinder its capacity to deliver on time. Preliminary indications of this happening have already surfaced, even as India’s Department of Military Affairs (DMA) initiates an audit to assess the damage. The need for India to diversify its import strategy has become doubly imperative now.

Despite immediate hiccups, New Delhi needs Moscow’s rapport with Beijing to keep tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) manageable. The manner in which India reached out to Putin during the Galwan clashes in 2020 shows this. Interestingly, on 4 March, senior Indian Army officers hinted at the possibility of a Ukraine-like situation afflicting the LAC. This is not just a recognition of the lingering Chinese threat, but could also be seen as India’s tacit message of disapproval for Moscow’s cross-border aggression.

India also cannot ignore the ramifications of its neutrality on its relationship with the West, which has emerged as a crucial partner for New Delhi on domains such as the Indo-Pacific. On 3 March, amidst the crisis, all members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – India, Japan, Australia and the US – met virtually and briefly discussed its core agendas while noting that the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” have to be respected. This showed that the Quad and other Indo-Pacific collectives will sustain in the near term, despite the crisis. The West has its own autonomous objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and it needs India to achieve those.

In all, there is little doubt that Russia’s Ukraine invasion will trigger some significant, if not tectonic, shifts in geopolitical and geostrategic thinking amongst big, middle and small powers. India today lies somewhere between the first two, which is a very awkward place to be at the moment. If India fails to reconcile with the complex new realities that this crisis is bound to create, it will continue to find itself on thin ice every time a global crisis of this nature rears its head.

Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

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Issue 21

Decluttering the Central University Entrance Test: Boons and Banes for Young Students 

The University Grants Commission’s decision to implement a Common University Entrance Test for undergraduate admission in all central universities in India reveals several problems that continue to plague the country’s higher education system. The revelation of the CUET plan has been communicated in a way that we do not yet know all the details, which means the final jury on the usefulness of the test will only be out once we witness its execution. Although the prevailing uncertainty can itself be a cause of heightened anxiety for students appearing for the test this year. Hence it may still be useful to scrutinise the test from what we know of it now. 

If we look at the possible benefits of the CUET; students will no longer have to depend on their 12th-grade marks for admission into colleges. This means that it does not matter how well students do throughout their 12th grade, the CUET provides everyone with a level playing field to get admissions into a good college without worrying about soaring cut-offs. The only caveat here is that the UGC has given Universities the liberty to set a lower threshold of 12th-grade marks as a criteria for admission. Another benefit of the CUET, given that it is expected to provide an interdisciplinary test, will allow students to prove their mettle across disciplines. This in turn will also allow students to study beyond their specialised streams in 12th grade. Lastly, the UGC Chairperson has categorically stated that the CUET will not change the status of caste and EWC based reservation of seats in Universities. Hence, reserved seats for students from socially and economically disadvantaged communities will not be affected due to the CUET. 
Having stated the possible benefits students may reap from the CUET, there are however several questions that loom large. First, how does replacing CUET scores with 12th-grade marks solve the problem of immense competition for undergraduate seats? If the problem was high cut-offs in top universities, what is the guarantee that students will not score high scores in the CUET resulting in the same competition for seats in top Universities? The CUET may be able to resolve the problem of over-admission in certain colleges due to high-cut offs, but it does not negate the possibility of over-admission in colleges due to the overflow of students who get high CUET scores.

Secondly, what is the guarantee that CUET will not become a humanities and commerce stream version of JEE or NEET? Competitive exams and entrance tests have reshaped higher education in India. While it has paved the way for talents to enter prestigious institutes, it has also resulted in a cutthroat culture of preparation that has often rendered students bleeding dry. The CUET may in fact pave the way for coaching institutes to jump on this opportunity and offer courses to “crack” the test. The financial pressures that emerge from coaching, the mentally and emotionally toxic environment it usually is, and the heavy financial expenses coaching often requires, make it an extremely damaging form of academic pursuit for the overall health of young students. Additionally, coaching institutes especially disadvantage underprivileged students. The UGC has not yet communicated the willingness or a way to prevent CUET from becoming the next big competitive entrance test in India. UGC did mention that the CUET will be based on the 12th-grade syllabus, which begs the question; how will it be any different than the 12th-grade examination? 

Thirdly, the timing of the declaration of the CUET was extremely poor. The current 12th-grade batch entered the academic year presuming the status quo for admissions into colleges. Yet they will finish their 12th grade by preparing for an entrance test they did not anticipate. The UGC could have announced the CUET earlier or postponed its execution for the admission cycle of 2023. Yet the decision to implement the CUET means the current 12th-grade batch will have to prepare for another exam right after finishing their final examination. 

Given the depth of problems that prevail in Indian higher education, and problems that are at the crossroads of being conflated due to the CUET, what can the UGC and the Ministry of Education do so that it does not become a damaging exercise for students? Firstly, the UGC has to ascertain that the tests are modelled in a way that does not emulate other entrance examinations. The objective should be for every student to be able to establish their aptitude. Following the ranking system or percentile system escalates the competitive nature of entrance examinations. Hence, CUET scores should be accorded the value of a purely individual aptitude marker. The UGC should also ascertain that private and public schools of all boards should take the responsibility to prepare students for the CUET, not through the means of extra classes or tuitions, but through in-class learning itself. 

Secondly, the government should also hold mock tests for the first batch of students appearing for the CUET. This is especially important for students from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds. The UGC has stated that the CUET will be a purely computer-based examination. Many students, especially in government schools, do not have access to computers. Hence the UGC needs to consider a mechanism, possibly incorporating written tests, to make the examination inclusive. 

The CUET may have been intended to revamp the process of undergraduate education and possibly make the transition from school to college less competitive. The fact however is that relentless competition for college seats will persist till the number of good colleges remains limited. The government has to prioritise improving the standard of higher education and ascertain students get a level playing field at every stage of their education. The pedagogical infrastructure in the country also privileges people from advantaged backgrounds. Greater investment, financially and intellectually, into school education is the first step towards creating a level playing field. Such efforts should be prioritised over any entrance test in the larger scheme of things. 

Biplob Kumar Das is a Graduate Student at Ashoka University currently pursuing an Advanced Major in Political Science and a Minor in Media Studies. He completed his undergraduate degree in Political Science and takes a keen interest in anything related to Indian politics, media, art and culture. 

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Issue 21

Russia-India Oil Deal: A Question of National Interest or Morality?

On March 22nd, India’s top oil refiner Indian Oil Corporation hiked the prices of petrol and diesel after almost 140 days of stalling. This comes after a massive surge in global crude oil prices–the key factor in determining domestic fuel rates–driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western sanctions on Russian-sourced oil. 

Despite these sanctions, the Indian Oil Corporation recently purchased three million barrels of crude oil from Russia at discounted rates–something that has not sat well with Western leaders. Jen Psaki, US President Joe Biden’s spokesperson, said on Monday regarding the issue that while the US understands the economic reasoning, “the rest of the world, is watching where you’re going to stand as it relates to conflict, whether its support for Russia in any form“. 

Reactions like these, that highlight India’s need for oil yet urge the country to look beyond economic needs, have caused great uproar among some commentators and the Indian government alike. They claim that since India imports 85% of its oil needs, the decision to buy Russian oil was one of necessity and not one of active choice. Further, fingers have also been pointed at European nations that continue to buy Russian oil in large quantities.

The debate surrounding this controversial purchase has mostly been framed around the tension between a country’s ‘legitimate economic interests’ and morality. The implication is that by purchasing Russian Oil, India is inadvertently funding Putin’s war machine. So, what exactly are India’s ‘legitimate economic interests’ here?

India, as a developing country, has a large middle class that is very sensitive to income shocks, i.e. a steep fall in income due to events like rising crude oil prices. High prices for oil on the global market means that the cost for almost everything increases (inflation) since most industries depend on oil products. This leads to people ultimately having less money in their pockets because incomes remain constant while expenses increase dramatically. 

Understandably, a population with less money is prone to civil unrest. A harrowing example of this is Sri Lanka, which is battling its worst economic crisis since the nation’s inception and the subsequent public unrest. Among other factors, surging oil prices have left the country dry of petrol and diesel in its fuel stations. The government has now called in the army after two men were reported to have died while waiting for petrol.

This could explain why the Indian government has been firm in its aim to avoid oil insufficiency. A recent paper by Economist Pranjul Bhandari calculated the effects on the Indian economy if oil were to be priced at $100 per barrel for an extended period. The paper forecasted around a one per cent decrease in India’s GDP if that were the case. To put that yardstick into context, the current prices are above $115. These are India’s legitimate economic interests. But, does buying oil from Russia actually fund its military capacity?

Vladimir Putin has been the de facto head of state for Russia for more than 20 years now. In that time he has built around himself a helpful cadre of Billionaires and Oligarchs who fund his political and military endeavours. Many of these people are in the oil business and hence, when Indian companies buy oil from them, the money does go into Putin’s vault indirectly. 

Although, as pointed out in Rajya Sabha by Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri, India imported less than 1% of its annual requirement from Russia last year. So the impact of Indian purchases on Russia’s military capacity seems minuscule. This is especially low in comparison to the European Union, which relies on Russia for 27% of its crude oil. India is buying oil from Russia only because it is cheap oil and not because it is Russian oil. 

It must also be pointed out that the Western concern that this move signals India’s affinity towards Russia is not fiction. Over the years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin have developed close personal ties. This is arguably one of the reasons Joe Biden has gone on record to call India’s confrontation with Russia “shaky”. Taking into account India’s abstentions at the UN and the fact that the country is considering a direct Rupee-Rouble corridor to bypass US Dollar based sanctions, this fear does not seem beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, Professor of Political Science Oleksandr Svitych has pointed out in an opinion article that even from a utilitarian perspective, showing overt solidarity with the tightly banded NATO countries also has economic benefits. Put plainly, siding with the ‘good’ side has long term benefits of cooperation and progress. In the meanwhile, India can source its oil from other oil-producing nations and bear the cost of ‘good’ behaviour for later returns.

This liberal internationalist perspective misses one crucial point though. None of the top ten oil-producing countries, barring Canada, have a great track record of human rights. The list includes Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter of oil to India, which has consistently conducted unlawful airstrikes in Yemen. This fact effectively makes it so that if India were to start buying more oil from countries like the UAE or Kuwait in lieu of Russian oil, we would still be funding unlawful killings, unjust wars and brutal autocrats. Since switching producers does not solve the problem of giving money to bad actors, we can just buy from the cheapest autocract around, the argument goes. In this case, the cheapest autocrat happens to be Vladimir Putin. 

Thus, it would be economically and politically imprudent for India to not buy oil from Russia at this moment. Though, India does need to come out with a stronger stance on Ukraine for us to be able to shelter the western anger over it in the long term. 

Rutuparna Deshpande is a second-year student of Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Ashoka University.

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Issue 21

The State of Electric Vehicles in India

Much like NFTs, cryptocurrencies and artificial intelligence, electric vehicles are increasingly becoming a buzzword not just around the world, but in India as well. Recent years have seen a surge in the popularity of the automobile industry’s electric vehicle segment. Following Union Minister Nitin Gadkari’s recent announcements regarding the expected sale of electric vehicles (EVs) jumping 10 times within the year and his commitment that “the cost of EVs will come down to a level that will be at par with their petrol variants” within two years, has led to a lot of excitement and speculation around the future of EVs in the country. 

With the sale of electric buses rising by 1200% and that of four-wheeler electric vehicles rising 230% over the past couple of years, the data certainly seems to justify this excitement. Adding to the buzz, was Suzuki Motor’s recent announcement that it would invest Rs. 10,440 crore towards the manufacturing of electric cars and batteries in India, with the objective of rolling out affordable EVs in Japan and India by 2025. A study has revealed that the EV market is likely to be valued at around Rs. 475 billion by 2025, with electric two-wheelers alone accounting for 15% of the market.  

While the popular belief is that firecrackers and stubble burning are to be blamed for air pollution, the reality is that the real culprit is electric vehicles. Scientific studies suggest that vehicular emissions contribute to greater than 50% of the air pollution, while the contribution of industrial emissions is 10-13%. While these statistics vary around the year depending on weather and other factors, the reality remains that vehicular emissions overwhelmingly contribute to the air pollution crisis, particularly in developing countries such as India. Proof of this reality was also seen during the first lockdown, with air pollution dropping by a staggering 79% – is indicative of the damage that fossil-fuel-powered vehicles wreck on the planet. 

Environmental degradation aside, with the rapid growth of EVs, consumers would have a natural incentive to switch, given that the per kilometre cost is Rs. 1 for EVs, while the same is Rs. 10 for petroleum vehicles and Rs. 7 for diesel vehicles. Furthermore, central and state governments have given a huge push to EVs through tax breaks, subsidies, and schemes, such as the ‘Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid) and Electric Vehicles (FAME)-II Scheme. 

Though the sector is poised to enter a new period of expansion, innovation, and investment as commercial activities pick up and the Indian economy recovers in 2022, several obstacles stand in the way of EV’s future. While the government is actively supporting EV use in India, insufficient infrastructure, a shortage of high-performance EVs, and a high upfront cost are preventing widespread adoption. There are a number of possible market hurdles that hinder the EV industry’s capacity to meet expanding demand, including an inadequate charging infrastructure that continues to stymie increased penetration in the two-wheeler consumer sector. In the future years, the lack of a viable manufacturing environment for the materials involved with the EV revolution, along with the concentration of the supply chain in select places, is expected to bring these challenges even more into the light.

These problems are particularly likely to emerge in smaller cities, given the rarity of charging stations – as compared to petrol pumps which are dotted even in the countryside. A further challenge lies in the limited availability of nickel and lithium – key components for EV batteries. The recent power crisis of October 2021, wherein India witnessed a record shortfall of coal supplies, must serve as a reminder for India’s overwhelming dependence on coal – with 70% of the country’s power coming from such fossil fuels. For electric vehicles to be truly green, charging stations must be powered by electricity sourced from renewable sources such as wind, solar and hydropower. 

In spite of this seeming myriad of challenges, there seems to be a lot of optimism regarding the future of EVs in the country. A reflection of this is being seen especially in metropolitan areas such as Delhi, where the state government’s decision to mandate the adoption of a search percentage of EVs in cab aggregators’ fleets has received a warm reception. Leading by example, the Delhi government has mandated that 25% of all new cars joining aggregators should compromise EVs, and this number should amount to 50% within two years. A prime example of the success of EVs is seen in the success of electric car aggregator BluSmart, an Uber-Ola like service which has received funding from giants like British Petroleum and Tata Motors. In less than 3 years of operation, the start-up has curbed 2145+ tonnes of CO2 emissions through over 10,00,000 rides provided to customers in the Delhi-NCR region.

With large original equipment manufacturers taking the initiative to enter the EV component industry in order to lessen dependency on imports and achieve the government’s 50 percent localization requirement for government subsidies, the future of the segment is certainly bright. A comprehensive infrastructure that is inexpensive, accessible, and supports all consumer groups, along with a solid finance environment, governmental incentives, and technology developments, is anticipated to position the electric vehicle industry for major expansion over the next decade.

Abhiir Bhalla is an active youth environmentalist at a global level and has been working in the field of environmental conservation for over 8 years. Identified by the BBC World News as amongst the foremost youth environmentalists in 2020, Abhiir and his work have been featured prominently in the national and international media

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Issue 21

The Act of Cleaning Up: River Rejuvenations and Its Many Delusions

On March 14th, Union Environment Minister Bhupendar Yadav unveiled a plan to rejuvenate 13 rivers in the country. The rivers that have been chosen for the rejuvenation process are Cauvery, Krishna, Mahanadi, Godavari, Narmada, Luni, Brahmaputra, Yamuna, Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum. The minister stated that the rejuvenation process for these thirteen rivers will follow the “successful implementation” of the Ganga model, and employ “forestry intervention” of afforesting the banks of the rivers as its primary approach. While implementation of such projects is vital to improving the conditions of the rivers, it is worth exploring the claimed “success” of past attempts at river rejuvenation, and what lessons could be learnt for future projects.  

In recent years, the most prominent attempt at river rejuvenation has been the Namami Gange project. In 2011 the Central Government had initiated the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG) under the Jal Shakti Ministry. Following the Ganga Action Plans I and II, undertaken in the 1980s and 90s, the Namami Gange Programme was implemented under the NMCG in 2014 as an “Integrated Conservation Mission” with the vision to abate pollution, as well as rejuvenate the Ganga. The government website for the programme enlists its key achievements as ‘Creating Sewerage Treatment Capacity,’ ‘Creating River-Front Development’, ‘River Surface Cleaning,’ ‘Afforestation,’ ‘Industrial Effluent Monitoring.’

While the deadline that the NMCG had set itself for the successful implementation of the Namami Gange project was December 2020, many projects under the programmes still seem to be in progress. Of the 346 projects undertaken through the programme, only 158 have been completed, as reported by The Wire. Furthermore, in November 2021 the National Green Tribunal had pulled up the NMCG for not being accountable to their timelines while suggesting that structural changes in the functioning of the NMCG should be considered to fix the lack of accountability and to achieve targets on time. The problems that persist in cleaning up Ganga became embodied most tragically during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic when dead bodies were seen floating on the Ganga at several places.Apart from the Ganga, the attempt to rejuvenate the Sabarmati river through the Sabarmati Riverfront Project is also worthy of speculation. The project began in 1997 with the vision to provide the city of Ahmedabad with a more environmentally conducive waterfront and improve standards of living in the city. Yet despite a concerted effort that was spread out over two decades, the river continues to be polluted. In a report published after an investigation jointly carried out by the Paryavaran Suraksha Samiti (PSS) and Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) in 2019, the dismal condition of the river due to industrial effluents was discussed. The report mentioned; “Sabarmati River no longer has any freshwater when it enters the city of Ahmedabad. The

Sabarmati Riverfront has merely become a pool of polluted stagnant water while the river, downstream of the riverfront, has been reduced to a channel carrying effluents from industries… The drought-like condition of the Sabarmati river intensified by the Riverfront Development has resulted in poor groundwater recharge and increased dependency on the already ailing Narmada river.” The examples of the Namami Gange Programme and the Sabarmati Riverfront project remain far from inspiring confidence for future projects of river rejuvenation.

There are several lessons that the government can learn from these projects. Firstly, a common problem that prevails in both Ganga and Sabarmati is sewage concentration. The government may have invested infrastructurally in riverfront development and river surface cleaning, but unless better methods for sewage treatment are not arrived upon, the rivers will continue to be polluted and affect livelihoods. A report by scientist Sanjay Dwivedi found that untreated sewage accounts for 75% of Ganga’s filth. The PSS and GPCB report already establish how Sabarmati continues to be infused with industrial effluents. Forestry interventions or afforesting the banks can only create more viable biodiversity in and around the rivers. However, the flow of industrial effluents and sewage concentration more or less renders any forestry interventions futile. Rivers such as Sutlej, Beas, in Punjab and Cauvery in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are extremely polluted and only forestry intervention methods will not resolve the magnanimity of the problem.

Secondly, consecutive governments and consecutive programmes have failed to immerse local communities in their projects to improve the rivers. The NMCG had initiated a plan to accord responsibilities to more than one thousand Gram Panchayats in the Ganga basin to create toilets and model villages. However, there has been no mechanism set up to involve the locals directly in the rejuvenation process. A more sustainable plan will not ignore the fact that local communities can become the most responsible executors of a rejuvenation programme if a central system of coordination system is facilitated for them. However, continuing to centralise and bureaucratise the process of rejuvenation without sufficient accountability and transparency only results in persisting hardships for locals around the rivers. No great river in the world was rejuvenated in a matter of a few years. Setting realistic timelines, prioritising scientific methods to prevent and treat sewage, and ascertaining full accountability, as suggested by the NGT, is the way to go for the impending rejuvenation of the thirteen rivers.

Biplob Kumar Das is a Graduate Student at Ashoka University currently pursuing an Advanced Major in Political Science and a Minor in Media Studies. He completed his undergraduate degree in Political Science and takes a keen interest in anything related to Indian politics, media, art and culture.

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